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Abstract:  Federal law mandates that audit and compensation committees of public companies be 
comprised entirely of independent directors. The assumption underlying these legal requirements 
is that independent directors are more likely to act as monitors of the company’s top 
management. In this paper, we test this assumption. We conduct our tests by examining the level, 
direction, and profitability of independent directors’ insider trades and compare these to the 
trades of other members of top management in firms defending class-action lawsuits. Our 
evidence indicates that there are no differences between the trading activity of independent 
directors and other insiders during the class period. Our findings cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of independent directors’ monitoring role. 
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The Elusive Monitoring Function of Independent Directors 
 
 
American corporate law has long relied on independent directors as a panacea to many 
challenging issues of corporate governance.1 One of the most important functions of independent 
board members is monitoring a company’s top management, to effectively protect shareholder 
interests.2 Generally, boards consist of independent directors as well as insiders, including the 
CEO who typically serves as the Chairman. Often, there are existing professional or social ties 
between the management and independent directors.3 But the extent to which these relationships 
might impair a director’s judgment is difficult to assess.4 Therefore, regulatory efforts tend to 
focus on the number of independent directors and their direct ties to the company.5  What is not 
obvious is whether lack of an explicit tie to management is sufficient for the independent 
directors to act in the best interest of the shareholders instead of their own best interests.   
 
Testing whether the independent directors protect shareholder interests against other top 
management is a difficult task because the individual voting records of directors are private.  We 
finesse this difficulty by focusing on the purchase and sales of stock by all insiders (instead of 
their votes), including the independent directors, in their own firms and comparing these patterns 
to each other.  We also focus on firms involved in class action lawsuits to refine our tests.      
 
This article thus seeks to examine these issues by empirically measuring the effectiveness 
of independent directors on company boards.  Specifically, we test two mutually exclusive 
hypotheses:  (1) independent directors act in favor of shareholders rather than in their self-
interest and (2) independent directors have been co-opted by management.  We test these 
hypotheses by examining the number and profitability of insider trades of top executives and 
independent directors.  We also compare insider trades in firms that have settled class action 
litigation with the trades in firms that were not involved in class action litigation.  
 
We analyze trades in firms involved in class action lawsuits that have resulted in large 
settlements because these events represent periods when the conflict of interest between top 
management and the shareholders is especially acute.  In effect, class-action litigation means that 
top management is alleged to have engaged in fraud to enhance their own narrow self-interest at 
the expense of their shareholders.  That top management has agreed to pay large sums to settle 
these cases also means that it is likely that plaintiffs could have won these cases upon trial.  
Thus, the settlement requirement reduces the likelihood of frivolous cases.  Consequently, class 
periods in settlement cases represent times when shareholders are in special need of protection 
from decisions of top management.  Therefore, it is important to know if independent directors 
live up to their monitoring responsibility when they matter most. 
                                                 
1 See Adam C. Pritchard, Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. 
KOREAN L. 1, 1-3 (2009).  
2 See Nicola Faith Sharpe, The Cosmetic Independence of Corporate Boards, 34 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1435, 1444-45 (2011). 
3 Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270 (1997). 
4 Id. at 279-80. 
5 See Sharpe, supra note 2, at 1436. 
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If independent directors are effective at monitoring other executives, we would expect 
that they would not be heavy sellers of company stock during the class action period.  If 
however, independent directors are co-opted by management, we would expect their behaviors 
with respect to selling their shares of company stock to coincide with the behavior of other top 
management – that is, that they would trade (sell) as heavily as the other insiders during the class 
action period and make similar abnormal trading profits as other top executives. As analyzed in 
Part III, the evidence indicates that independent directors, along with management, trade (sell) 
intensely and earn large abnormal profits on material non-public information during the class 
period, supporting the hypothesis that they have been co-opted by management.  Thus, a 
corporate governance system that in theory relies on the capability of independent directors to 
effectively monitor management behavior is seriously flawed in practice. Our evidence indicates 
that simply requiring certain number of independent directors has not resulted in an effective 
system of monitoring, but rather created of an illusion of it. 
 
To address these issues, this manuscript is organized as follows.  Part I begins with a 
discussion of the development of the monitoring role of corporate boards and addresses the 
myriad of contexts in which the law relies on the independence of independent directors to 
monitor management.  Part II then examines empirical studies that have attempted to discern the 
effectiveness of independent board members in corporate governance.  Parts III and IV describe 
and analyze our empirical study and implications for improving corporate governance.  Our 
recommendations and concluding remarks follow. 
 
 
I. The Monitoring Role of Corporate Boards 
 
Up until the 1970s, company boards were dominantly comprised of company executives.6 
Inside directors are uniformly defined as directors who are currently employed by the 
corporation.7 Two events, however, triggered reform and called for the inclusion of independent 
board members—corporate scandals and academic publications.8 With the rise of the shareholder 
primacy model,9 academic research examined managerial behavior, ownership structure, and 
agency costs, with a focus on the costs of dereliction in managerial behavior on shareholder 
value.10 As a result, these studies seem to suggest that managers should be monitored to 
                                                 
6 Brian R. Cheffins, Delaware and the Transformation of Corporate Governance, 40 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 32 (2015). 
7 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 133 (2010). 
8 HARALD BAUM, THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (forthcoming 2017).  
9 Lynn A. Stout, On the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, Signs of Its Fall, and the Return of 
Managerialism (in the Closet), 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1169, 1177 (2013). 
10 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (examining such topics 
as agency, social responsibility, and separation of control and ownership); see also Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J. LAW & ECON. 301, 321-
23 (1983) (examining separation of risk-bearing and decision-making). See generally Michael C. 
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maximize shareholder wealth.11 Insiders have been presumed to be biased and lacking in 
objectivity with respect to decisions made by other managers, and thus, cannot be trusted.12 In 
contrast, at least in theory, independent directors should be capable of impartially assessing the 
actions and decisions of the company, making them better suited to monitor the organization, 
than even external regulators.13 In addition, the introduction of calls for corporations to examine 
their social responsibilities in the 1970s conceptualized the corporate board as an independent 
and objective decision-making authority.14 To protect shareholder value, more independent board 
members were needed on company boards.15 
 
The 1978 Corporate Director’s Guidebook was the first (advisory) attempt to distinguish 
between outsiders and insiders on the board.16 In addition, in 1994 the American Law Institute 
published its highly influential Principles of Corporate Governance, recommending rules for the 
composition of the boards.17 The trend for increasing the number of independent members on the 
board of directors grew gradually in the ensuing decades—the ratio of independent directors on 
company boards increased to 75% in the mid-2000s from 20% in 1950s.18 As of 2017, 
independent members share increased up to 84% of all board members, with the CEO serving as 
the only insider on the boards in the majority of the S&P 500 companies.19  
The primary purpose of having outsiders on company boards is to monitor the CEO and 
other insiders in the C-suite.20 Shareholders want to minimize executive perquisites to maximize 
firm value.21 The beliefs that outsiders are well-equipped to monitor insiders and that 
independent supervision is the best way to increase the company’s performance became so 
strong in the past decades that researchers have called for increasing the number of outsiders on 
                                                 
Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 
J. FIN. 831 (1993). 
11 See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 10, at 309-310 (noting that most of the literature in this area 
focuses on how “to provide appropriate incentives for the agent [defined broadly] to make 
choices which will maximize the principal’s welfare given that uncertainty and imperfect 
monitoring exist”).  
12 Fairfax, supra note 7, at 139. 
13 Id. at 141. 
14 Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518-19 (2007). 
15 Id. 
16 See generally Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591 (1978). 
17 BAUM, supra note 8. 
18 See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1471.  
19 Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence 
Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 45–46 (2017). 
20 Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 789 (2011). 
21 Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FINANCE 217, 241 
(2007). 
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the board; for example, Lipton and Lorsch recommend at least two thirds of the membership of 
the board be comprised of independent directors.22  
Massive takeover activities in the 1980s emphasized the importance of independent 
directors in the context of evaluating the business judgment of the board.23 This trend continued 
through 1990s with markets concentrating on executive rights and compensation.24 Corporate 
financial responsibility scandals in 2000s and the collapse of such giants as Enron and 
WorldCom stimulated the Congress to act against corporate fraud. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX)25 mandated complete audit committee independence.26 In the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act27 established the requirement of independence of the compensation 
committee of the board.28 
 
The concept of independence is not statutorily defined in Delaware. Instead, courts have 
judicially developed the doctrine and emphasized the role of independent directors in many 
corporate governance challenges. The next section examines these contexts. 
 
A. Self-Dealing Transactions 
In the self-dealing context, to receive the protection of the business judgment rule (BJR), 
a director must be, among other qualifications, disinterested and independent.29 The business 
judgment rule provides a presumption that the director acted in good faith and in the best interest 
of the corporation.30 Where the BJR applies, courts do not second-guess the business decision in 
the absence of gross negligence, conflict of interest or intentional misconduct.31 The Delaware 
legislature provided further protection for transactions where the director has a conflict of 
interest in Section 144(a)(1) of the Delaware Code.32 This statute provides that a transaction 
between a corporation and an interested director or officer is void or voidable solely for this 
reason unless the interest is disclosed to the board of directors or the committee, and the board or 
committee in good faith authorizes the transaction by the affirmative votes of a majority of the 
disinterested directors.33 Thus, in a conflicted transaction, a director often seeks ratification by 
majority of independent directors to receive the BJR protection. According the court in Cooke v.  
                                                 
22 Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 
BUS. LAW 59, 67-68 (1992). 
23 BAUM, supra note 8. 
24 Id. 
25 The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C.A. § 7220 (West 2010). 
26 SOX § 301. 
27 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929-Z, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
28 Dodd-Frank Act § 952. 
29 Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2000). 
30 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)). 
31 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
32 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(1)(a) (West 2010). 
33 § 144(1)(a). 
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Oolie, under § 144(a)(1),34 the business judgment rule applies to the “actions of an interested 
director, who is not the majority shareholder, if the interested director fully discloses his or her 
interest and a majority of the disinterested directors ratify the interested transaction.”35  Thus, 
ratification by disinterested directors resolves the conflict in the director’s favor. 
Judicial deference to ratification by independent directors is explained further in Cooke, 
where the court emphasized, that “the disinterested directors' ratification cleanses the taint of 
interest because the disinterested directors have no incentive to act disloyally and should be only 
concerned with advancing the interests of the corporation.”36 The court thus presumes “that the 
vote of a disinterested director signals that participation in the interested transaction is in the best 
interests of the corporation despite the interest of one or more directors.”37 Moreover, according 
to Cooke, the disinterested directors' vote in favor of proposal supports that the conflicted 
directors acted in good faith and in the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.38 Thus, if 
the deal was to the detriment of other shareholders, the independent directors in question would 
not have voted in favor of it.39 Similarly, in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., the Delaware court 
previously held that one director's interest in a challenged transaction is not sufficient, without 
more, to deprive a board of the protection of the business judgment rule presumption when the 
transaction was ratified by independent directors.40  
 
B. Controlling Shareholder Transactions 
 
Independent board member ratification plays an important role in the context of 
transactions instituted by controlling shareholders.  In Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, the court pointed 
out that an independent bargaining structure is powerful evidence of the fairness of a merger 
transaction.41  The case-by-case judicial review of these transactions focuses on factual evidence 
of whether the special committee appointed to evaluate the transaction was truly independent, 
fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm's length.42  Under Delaware law, the 
business judgment rule, as opposed to entire fairness, is the standard of review that governs 
going-private mergers “between a controlling stockholder and its corporate subsidiary, where the 
merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-
empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of 
a majority of the minority stockholders.”43  
 
                                                 
34 § 144. 
35 2000 WL 710199, at *13. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 363–64 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 
(Del. 1994). 
41 Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 938 n.7 (Del. 1985). 
42 Id. at 938-39. 
43 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
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 In In re Pure Res., Inc., Shareholders Litigation, a case involving a tender offer, the 
court pointed out that: 
 
the majority stockholder owes a duty to permit the independent directors on the target board 
both free rein and adequate time to react to the tender offer, by (at the very least) hiring 
their own advisors, providing the minority with a recommendation as to the advisability of 
the offer, and disclosing adequate information for the minority to make an informed 
judgment.44  
As the court further notes, in a non-coercive tender offer context, independent directors of the 
target firm “are permitted to make an informed recommendation and provide fair disclosure,” 
and the law should be reluctant to impose the entire fairness standard of review.45  
 
Likewise, In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. Shareholder Litigation,46 the court also 
expressly declined to extend the entire fairness review to the case involving an interested cash-
out merger and the protection of minority shareholders.47  According to the court, the business 
judgment rule would be the applicable standard of review “if the transaction were (1) 
recommended by a disinterested and independent special committee, and (2) approved by 
stockholders in a non-waivable vote of the majority of all the minority stockholders.”48  Another 
court stated that in controlling shareholder buyouts, the business judgment rule will be applied 
only when:  
 
(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a 
Special Committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee 
is independent; (iii) the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors 
and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating 
a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the 
minority.49   
 
C. Special Litigation Committees 
 
The issue of independence of corporate directors has attracted much of the Delaware 
courts’ attention in the context of special litigation committees (SLCs) appointed to evaluate 
whether shareholder derivative suits should proceed. The Delaware courts have recognized the 
effectiveness of derivative suits as an intra-corporate means of policing boards of directors.50 
Derivative suits involve a corporate claim for wrongdoing against an officer with an injury to the 
corporation, as opposed to the suing shareholder. Thus, the injury is indirect to the plaintiff, and 
the compensation for the harm is paid to the company.  
                                                 
44 In re Pure Res., Inc., Shareholders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 445–46 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2002). 
45 Id. 
46 No. CIV. A. 758-CC, 2009 WL 3165613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2009). 
47 See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc., 2009 WL 3165613, at *2 (explaining, however, that 
the procedures used in this case were not sufficient to invoke business judgment review). 
48 Id. at *12. 
49 Kahn, A.3d 635 at 645. 
50 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). 
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To bring a derivative action, among other standing prerequisites, plaintiff must first 
demand that the board of directors pursue the cause of action on behalf of the company, unless 
demand is futile.51 The reasoning behind the pleading rule, as noted in Levine v. Smith, is to 
strike a balance between a right to assert such a claim and a board of directors' duty to decide 
whether they should invest the resources of the company for this purpose.52 To demonstrate the 
futility of the demand, the court must answer affirmatively the questions of “(1) whether 
threshold presumptions of director disinterest or independence are rebutted by well-pleaded 
facts; and, if not, (2) whether the complaint pleads particularized facts sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business 
judgment.”53 When lack of independence is charged in the latter context, “a plaintiff must show 
that the board is either dominated by an officer or director who is the proponent of the 
challenged transaction or that the board is so under his influence that its discretion is 
‘sterilize[d].’”54 
 
In general, in a demand futility context, if no special litigation committee exists, directors 
are “presumed to be independent.”55 A claim of lack of independence must be supported by a 
reasonable inference that the director is “beholden to a controlling person or ‘so under their 
influence that their discretion would be sterilized.’”56 Thus, a non-interested director is not 
independent if particularized allegations support the inference that he or she “would be more 
willing to risk his or her reputation than risk the relationship with the interested [person].”57  
 
The court answered affirmatively, however, in Zapata v. Maldando,58 the question of 
whether the board, after it has been tainted by the self-interest most of the members, can legally 
delegate the authority to determine whether a derivative suit should proceed to a special litigation 
committee (SLC) that consists of two disinterested directors.59 The court further pointed out that 
“at le[a]st by analogy to our statutory section on interested directors, it seems clear that the 
Delaware statute is designed to permit disinterested directors to act for the board.”60 The 
                                                 
51 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(1). Plaintiff must state with particularity: “(A) any effort by the plaintiff to 
obtain the desired action from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the 
shareholders or members; and (B) the reasons for not obtaining the action or not making the 
effort.” Id. 
52 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991), overruled on procedural grounds, Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).   
53 Id. at 205. 
54 Id. (citation omitted). 
55 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. 2004). 
56 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 2009 WL 2225958, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24, 
2009) (quoting Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993)). 
57 Stewart, 845 A.2d at 1052. 
58 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
59 Id. at 786. 
60 Id. 
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committee, therefore, may, on the corporation’s behalf, to move to dismiss derivative litigation 
that may be believed as detrimental to the corporation.61 
 
The independence of special litigation committees plays a crucial role in this context 
because of the risk to the effectiveness of derivative suits as a corporate monitoring mechanism. 
Thus, to find the right balance, the Zapata court declined to accept the view that business 
judgment of special litigation committees is not subject to judicial review even if the committee 
acted independently, in good faith, and conducted a reasonable investigation.62  
 
In addition, the SLC in Zapata was formed four years after the litigation started and 
demand had been excused.63 In this context, the court noted that “we must be mindful that 
directors are passing judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and fellow directors, 
in this instance, who designated them to serve both as directors and committee members.”64 The 
question, as the court noted, naturally arises, “whether a ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ 
empathy might not play a role.65 And the further question arises whether inquiry as to 
independence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse, 
perhaps subconscious abuse.”66  
 
The Zapata court answered the latter question negatively in the context of the case, and 
thus, created a two-step test in deciding a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based on the 
judgment of the SLC. For the first step, a court must look into the independence, as well as the 
good faith, of the committee, and a court should inquire into the bases that support the 
committee’s conclusions with the burden of proof on corporation.67 Second, it is upmost 
importance to balance legitimate claims addressed in a derivative stockholder suit, with the 
corporation's best interests in pursuing those claims, as judged by an independent investigating 
committee.68 Recognizing the danger of judicial overreaching, it held that courts should 
determine, in their own independent business judgment, whether the motion should be granted.69 
 
D. The Sarbanes Oxley Act 
Federal securities laws did not directly address issues of corporate governance, especially 
issues regarding board structure, size, and independence of directors before the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act was enacted.70  SOX was controversial, in part, because corporate governance had been 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 787. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 788. 
68 Id. at 789. 
69 Id. at 788-89. 
70 See James S. Linck et al., The Determinants of Board Structure, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 308, 310 
(2008) (“Prior to SOX, the securities laws did not directly address board composition, board size, 
and director qualifications”). 
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primarily the province of state law.71 Furthermore, courts were reluctant to dictate a board 
structure.72 The importance of the participation of independent members, especially in the 
merger context, began to arise even before SOX, however.73 Commentators have thus suggested 
that because there is a well-functioning market for directors, direct regulation, i.e., SOX, might 
be unnecessary and counter-productive.74    
 
Though the need for independent board members and auditors gained importance after 
the Enron scandal,75 independence was already an important issue in sensitive industries.76  An 
example is investment companies or funds.77  Because the board of directors plays a critical role 
in operations of funds and protecting interests of shareholders, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) imposed an at least 40% independence requirement on board of directors of 
investment companies in 1999.78  Later, with the rash of financial scandals, independence 
became a more important issue.79 
 
After the Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Adelphia scandals, as well as many 
other company failures at the beginning of 2000s, the SEC and members of the U.S. Congress 
began to address auditing and corporate governance principles.80 The major outcome of this 
                                                 
71 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1527-28 (2005). 
72 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End? 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 534, 548 (1984) (“Board structure, however, is not a matter that has been, or . . . 
can be dictated by judicial decisions. . . . Thus, the board structure sections fall squarely into the 
grey area . . . .”). 
73 See Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 1205 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 273 (1997) (“This is most 
apparent in the merger context, in which the courts have required active participation by 
the board and have held independent directors accountable. . . . Particularly when independent 
directors serve on special committees, courts appear to take for granted active participation 
extending well beyond the monitoring function”). 
74 See, e.g., David Yermack, Board Members and Company Value, 20 FIN. MARKETS & 
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 33 (2006) (“[T]his evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for 
directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-
productive”). 
75 See The Lessons from Enron, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2002), 
https://www.economist.com/node/976011/print (“Companies need stronger non-executive 
directors, paid enough to devote proper attention to the job; genuinely independent audit and 
remuneration committees; more powerful internal auditors; and a separation of the jobs of 
chairman and chief executive”). 
76 INTERPRETIVE MATTERS CONCERNING INDEP. DIRECTORS OF INV. COMPANIES, SECURITIES ACT 
RELEASE No. 24083, 1999 WL 820629, at *2 (Oct. 14, 1999), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/ic-24083.htm. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 JOHN C. COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7-8 (2006). 
80 ROBERT R. MOELLER, COSO ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT: ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE 
GOVERNANCE, RISK, AND COMPLIANCE (2nd ed. 2011). 
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process was the Sarbanes Oxley Act.81  SOX codified certain standards for corporate executives, 
board of directors, and audit committees.82 Section 301 of SOX regulates audit committee 
independence and requires all committee members to be independent directors. Moreover, under 
SOX, the board of directors may not hire company managers for consulting services.83  
 
The legislative history of SOX shows that Mr. Oxley, a member of the Committee on 
Financial Services, had a number of concerns with the bill.84 Among other things, Mr. Oxley was 
concerned with:  (1) whether the rules, standards and practices relating to determining whether 
independent directors are in fact independent are adequate; (2) whether rules relating to the 
independence of directors serving on audit committees are adequate to protect investors and are 
uniformly applied; (3) whether the duties and responsibilities of audit committees should be 
established by the SEC; and (4) what further or additional practices or standards might best 
protect investors and promote the interests of shareholders.85  
 
According to Mr. Oxley, the bill lacked provisions to ensure that independent directors 
are truly independent.86 Explaining further, he stated that the bill should have eliminated the 
practice of compensating independent directors as “consultants” while they are members of the 
board.87 Lynn Turner, former Chief Accountant of the SEC, among others, argued that paying 
directors as consultants is “back door compensation that fundamentally undermines their 
independence.”88 Significant consulting compensation, thus, disincentives an otherwise 
independent director from challenging the same management that is paying for their consulting 
services.89 The thinking is that a provision prohibiting directors from providing consulting 
services would help ensure that directors act in the best interests of shareholders, devoid of 
conflicts of interest.90 But the amendment, prohibiting independent directors from serving as 
consultants, did not pass.  The vote was 20 yeas and 38 nays.91 
 
                                                 
81 See SOX, supra note 25. 
82 Id. 
83 MOELLER, supra note 80. SOX requires audit committees to be comprised solely of 
independent board members. (“[e]ach member of the audit committee of the issuer shall be a 
member of the board of directors of the issuer, and shall otherwise be independent.”). 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1 (2010). To be independent, “a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other 
than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any 
other board committee—(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the 
issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.” § 78j-1(m)(3)(B)(i)-
(ii). 
84 H.R. REP. NO. 107-414, at 44-45 (2002).  
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 49. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 50. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 28. 
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In addition, Mr. Oxley advocated for shareholder approval of compensation in the form 
of stock option plans.92 But according to SEC Chairman Pitt, stock options fail to align the 
interests of management with those of shareholder.  He proposed specific measures to fix the 
stock option arrangements93 requiring, in addition to shareholder approval, a committee of 
independent directors to make the decisions granting options to senior management.94 
 
Joseph V. Del Raso, a partner at Pepper Hamilton LLP, testified at a hearing of the House 
Financial Services Committee, emphasizing that the majority of boards of directors take their 
responsibilities very seriously,95 especially in the post-Enron and post-Global Crossing world, 
and that independent directors “have become increasingly aggressive in acting as watchdogs over 
their respective shareholders interests.” 96 Del Raso then concluded that any additional regulation 
may “further dampen the enthusiasm of qualified people to serve as independent directors.”97 
Thus, he expressed concern that further initiatives, including personal liability expenses “except 
in the most egregious cases of willful, wanton misconduct and onerous regulatory sanctions,” are 
likely to discourage these individuals from serving as independent directors.98 
 
Other testimony included that of Mr. Philip Livingston, President and CEO of Financial 
Executives International, advocating that companies be required to provide a report of key 
corporate governance practices.  Further, he said that the current best practice was to have a 
governance and nominating committee composed of independent directors.99 
 
Mr. Jerry J. Jasinowski, President National Association of Manufacturers argued that the 
audit committee should be composed of members who are well-informed on matters of corporate 
accounting and finance as well as experienced in management of corporate affairs.100 He further 
contended that the audit committee needs to work closely with management and the outside 
auditors yet maintain necessary independence in order operate sufficiently in its supervisory 
review function.101 He concluded that the independence of outside auditors and audit committees 
                                                 
92 Id. at 53. 
93 Id. at 52. 
94 Id. 
95 Testimony Concerning the Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and 
Transparence Act: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the H. Sec. & Exchange Comm., 107th Cong. 
102 (Statement of Joseph V. Del Raso, Partner, Pepper Hamilton LLP). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 362. 
98 Id. (“They are keenly aware of the realities of shareholder litigation, the parameters 
surrounding appropriate indemnities, and the finite limits of directors’ and officers’ liability 
coverage if the corporate indemnity is insufficient”). 
99 Id. at 371 (Statement of Philip Livingston, President & CEO, Financial Executives 
International). 
100 Id. at 392 (Statement of Jerry J. Jasinowski, President, National Association of 
Manufacturers). 
101 Id. 
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must be preserved in “the quest for providing complete and accurate information about the 
enterprise’s operational and financial status.”102 
 
Also testifying before the Financial Services Committee, Mr. Damon Silvers, Associate 
General Counsel at the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
pointed out that corporate governance begins with the board,103 and companies need directors 
who are both strong and independent.104 He explained that part of the problem at Enron was that 
Enron “touted directors as independent who really had significant ties to Enron management, ties 
that Enron did not have to disclose.”105 Therefore, boards should disclose all ties between board 
members, the company and company management to investors.106  Also, in agreement with these 
sentiments, Mr. Silvers further testified that corporate governance is in need of more effective 
boards and audit committees.107 For example, requiring independence of a number of board 
members in general and audit committee members in particular and along with finance and 
financial reporting skills should lead to more effective monitoring of management.108 
 
E. Stock Exchanges  
In 1998, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) sponsored a so-called Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the 
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (the Committee).109 The Committee issued a report 
with ten recommendations to improve the effectiveness of audit committees.110 The NYSE, 
NASD and other exchanges revised their listing standards to comply these recommendations.111  
However, in 2002, in light of high profile corporate failures, the NYSE and NASD filed further 
corporate governance reform proposals. In addition, pursuant to SOX, the SEC proposed Rule 
10A-3 under the Exchange Act.112 This rule requires audit committees of public companies to be 
independent as well as other substantive rules, regulating operations of the committees.113 New 
NYSE and NASD and other exchange listing requirements were formed based on the new rule.  
 
                                                 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 494 (Statement of Mr. Damon Silvers, Associate General Counsel, American Federation 
of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 495-97. 
108 Id. 
109 SEC Press Release 98-95, SEC Chairman Levitt Announces Action Plan to Improve Quality 
of Corporate Financial Reporting (Sept. 28, 1998), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1998/98-95.txt; SEC Press Release 2000-23, Pitts 
Seeks Review of Corporate Governance, Code of Conduct (Feb. 13, 2002), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-23.txt. 
110 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORPORATE AUDIT COMMITTEES (1999).  
111 AUDIT COMM. DISCLOSURE, RELEASE NO. 42266 (Dec. 22, 1999). 
112 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3 (West 2018). 
113 Id. 
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After SOX imposed independence requirements on audit committees, the NYSE and 
NASDAQ put more emphasis on regulation of director independence.  New market listing 
standards required more independence than the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange 
Act)114 or SOX.  The NYSE mandates that the boards of listed companies be comprised of a 
majority of independent board members,115 and that the audit and compensation committees be 
comprised of all independent directors.116 To be independent, the director must not have a 
material relationship with the company directly or as a partner, shareholder or officer of an 
organization that has a relationship with the company.117 The determination whether a particular 
relationship qualifies as a material is left to the board to decide, leaving a significant gray zone in 
the definition.118 The determinations are also left uncontested by the stock exchanges or the 
SEC, leading to the lack of proactive enforcement of their own requirements.119  
 
In addition, the NYSE manual provides a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors for 
determining independence of members of the compensation committee, evaluating that director's 
ability to be independent from management.120 The NASDAQ Listing Manual utilizes a similar 
framework.121 It follows that according to SOX and the exchange rules, independence is tied to 
the outsider status, as someone who lacks certain ties to those in control of the corporation.122  
 
Interestingly, in M & F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that 
satisfaction of the NYSE standards of independence may serve as an illustrative and informative 
factor for the Delaware Court but is not conclusive.123 The Sandys v. Pincus court also found that 
                                                 
114 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (West 2010). 
115 NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 303A.01 (2009).  
116 Id. 
117 NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 303A.02 (2013). 
118 Nili, supra note 19, at 40. 
119 Id. at 40. 
120 Id. These factors include the source of compensation, whether such director is affiliated with 
the listed company, or its employee (or has been within the last three years,) or an immediate 
family member is an executive officer of the listed company. In addition, if the director has 
received, or has an immediate family member who has received, during any twelve-month period 
within the last three years, more than $120,000 in direct compensation from the listed company, 
other than director and committee fees and pension or other forms of deferred compensation for 
prior service (provided such compensation is not contingent in any way on continued service), 
then such member is not independent. Id. at 51-52, 51 n.91. 
121 NASDAQ Listed Co. Manual § IM-5605 (2013).   
122 See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 450 (2008) 
(“The hallmark of the independent director, so conceived, is an absence of ties to those in control 
of the corporation”). 
123 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 649 n.26 (Del. 2014). The Court stated 
that “record does not support the Appellants' contention that that the Court of Chancery “relied 
heavily” on New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) rules in assessing the independence of the 
Special Committee, and that the application of such rules “goes against longstanding Delaware 
precedent.” The Court of Chancery explicitly acknowledged that directors' compliance with 
NYSE independence standards “does not mean that they are necessarily independent under 
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a company’s determination under the NASDAQ rules that a director as independent is also 
relevant under Delaware law.124 Professor Langevoort, however, argues that to be independent, a 
lack of financial or material connections to management must be supplemented with “a 
willingness to bring a high degree of rigor and skeptical objectivity to the evaluation of company 
management and its plans and proposals.”125  
 
F. Challenges to Independence of the Board Committee Members 
 
Delaware builds the notion of independence on a situational approach, thus shifting the 
focus of concern and evaluating specific conflict of interest based on its context. In M&F 
Worldwide Corp., plaintiffs challenged the independence of the members of the Special 
Litigation Committee selected to evaluate a merger.126 As to the first committee member 
challenged, the court concluded that although that the member had engaged in business dealings 
with a conflicted director nine years earlier, this relationship did not undermine his ability to 
evaluate the merger impartially.127 Another member of the special committee received $200,000 
as the head of a law firm, prior to serving on the committee. The member's law firm advised the 
defendant corporation and another company there M & F owned a 37.6% stake, and earned the 
amount in legal fees.128 The court held that $200,000 compensation was not material to the 
member of the special committee, “in the sense that it would have influenced his decision-
making with respect to the M & F proposal.129 The member was also a law professor at 
Georgetown. The plaintiff alleged a possible influence on the committee member’s position at 
Georgetown Law based on his decision regarding the merger because and another conflicted and 
                                                 
[Delaware] law in particular circumstances.” The record reflects that the Court of Chancery 
discussed NYSE standards on director independence for illustrative purposes.” Id. 
124 See Sandy v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 132–33 (Del. 2016). The court reasoned that: 
The bottom line under the NASDAQ rules is that a director is not independent if she has a 
“relationship which, in the opinion of the Company's board of directors, would interfere 
with the exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. 
Id. Further: 
The NASDAQ rules' focus on whether directors can act independently of the company or 
its managers has important relevance to whether they are independent for purposes of 
Delaware law. Our law is based on the sensible intuition that deference ought to be given 
to the business judgment of directors whose interests are aligned with those of the 
company's stockholders. Precisely because of that deference, if our law is to have integrity, 
Delaware must be cautious about according deference to directors unable to act with 
objectivity. To consider directors independent on a Rule 23.1 motion generates 
understandable skepticism in a high-salience context where that determination can short-
circuit a merits determination of a fiduciary duty claim. 
Id. 
125 Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798 (2001). 
126 M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d at 647. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
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influential member was on the Georgetown Board of Visitors.130 But because the member was 
tenured before he met the conflicted director, the court rejected the argument that there was 
influence on his independent decision-making.  
 
That the member was also invited a few months after the approval to join the board of 
directors of Revlon, Inc., a company at which one of the defendants served on the board, That 
fact did not raise a triable issue, according to the court, because there was no evidence that the 
committee member expected to be asked to join Revlon's board at the time he served on the 
Special Committee. 131 And finally, the evidence of prior business relationships prior to 1996 had 
no bearing because there was no evidence that the committee member had an ongoing economic 
relationship after 1996 with Perelman (who owned 43.4% of M & F stock and was member of 
the board) that was material to her in any way.132 
 
According to the M & F Worldwide court: 
 
to show that a director is not independent, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the director is 
“beholden” to the controlling party.133 Bare allegations that directors are friendly with, 
travel in the same social circles as, or have past business relationships with the proponent 
of a transaction or the person they are investigating are not enough to rebut the presumption 
of independence.134 
 
In addition, a plaintiff who is attempting to demonstrate that a director was not 
independent must meet a materiality standard — ties must be sufficiently substantial that a 
member’s ability to objectively discharge his or her fiduciary duties would be impaired.135 The 
court also held that the presence of some financial ties between the interested party and the 
director, with nothing more of concern, is not sufficient to disqualify a director.136 “The inquiry 
must be whether, applying a subjective standard, those ties were material, in the sense that the 
alleged ties could have affected the impartiality of the individual director.”137  
 
Another court, however, found the compensation at issue as disqualifying in In re 
Emerging Communications, Inc. Shareholders Litigation.138 This court questioned the 
independence of the special committee member because of his prior significant consultant fees, 
received from the defendant company.139  In contrast, in Citron v. Fairchild Camera & 
                                                 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 647-48. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 648–49. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 649. 
136 Id. at 649-50. 
137 Id. at 649. 
138 No. CIV.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *33 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004). 
139 See id. The court noted that: 
[b]efore 1996, the percentage of total fees represented by work [the director] performed for 
[the defendant] was always greater than fifty percent. From 1987 through 1998, [the 
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Instrument Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that an independent director who was 
elected by and represented one of the company’s largest shareholders, was nonetheless a 
disinterested director.140 The shareholder owned approximately 11.5% shares of the company.141 
Yet, in the current era of increasing institutional activism, such a large stake may defacto be 
controlling. Whether the independent director would be able to be impartial irrespective of the 
large shareholder’s interests is unclear, especially, because this director’s position is a result of 
the shareholder’s selection. Thus, there is a great likelihood that minority shareholders’ interests 
might not be adequately represented by this director.  
 
The court went further in tightening requirements of the independence of a SLC members 
in In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation.142 The issue in Oracle involved whether to grant the 
motion to dismiss the derivative suit based on the recommendation of the SLC.  It noted that the 
question of independence “turns on whether a director is, for any substantial reason, incapable of 
making a decision with only the best interests of the corporation in mind,” ultimately focusing on 
impartiality and objectivity.143  
 
The Oracle court’s findings were striking. The two SLC members—both of whom are 
professors at Stanford University—served on the SLC which investigated other Oracle 
directors.144  The directors under investigation maintained significant ties to Stanford:145  
 
Among the directors who [were] accused by the derivative plaintiffs of insider trading 
are: (1) another Stanford professor, who had taught one of the SLC members when the 
SLC member was a Ph.D. candidate and who served as a senior fellow and a steering 
committee member alongside that SLC member at the Stanford Institute for Economic 
Policy Research “SIEPR”; (2) a Stanford alumnus who ha[d] directed millions of dollars 
of contributions to Stanford during recent years, serve[d] as Chair of SIEPR's Advisory 
Board, was an ha[d] a conference center named for him at SIEPR's facility, and ha[d] 
contributed nearly $600,000 to SIEPR and the Stanford Law School, both parts of 
Stanford with which one of the SLC members [was] closely affiliated; and (3) Oracle's 
CEO, who ha[d] donated millions of dollars to in donations to Stanford through a 
                                                 
defendant company and its affiliates] were the largest single client of [the defendant’s] 
firm. In 1998, [the member] became “of counsel” at his firm and was put on a retainer 
arrangement wherein [the defendant’s company] paid compensation of $25,000 per month 
to [the member], and $5,000 per month to his firm. That amount represented all of [the 
member's] compensation for 1998. 
Id. 
140 Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 65 (Del. 1989). 
141 Id. at 56. 
142 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 817 A.2d 149 (Del.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1032, 123 S.Ct. 2076, 155 L.Ed.2d 
1061 (2003).   
143 Id. at 920 (quoting Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror Image Internet, Inc., 794 A.2d 1211, 1232 
(Del.Ch.2001) (emphasis in original). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
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personal foundation and large donations indirectly through Oracle, and who was 
considering making further donations of his $100 million house and $170 million for a 
scholarship program [at around the same time period the SLC members were added to the 
Oracle board].146 
 
As the Oracle court pointed out that “it is no easy task to decide whether to accuse a 
fellow director of insider trading.”147 The SLC members were required to decide whether to 
accuse a fellow professor and two large benefactors of their university of a crime which is 
inconsistent, according to the court, with the concept of independence.148 The court admitted that 
both SLC members were distinguished in their fields, highly respected and have tenure.149 In 
addition, the plaintiffs presented no evidence that SLC members had fundraising responsibilities 
at Stanford.150 Thus, the court acknowledged and focused its attention on the question “whether 
the ties would be of a material concern to two distinguished, tenured faculty members whose 
current jobs would not be threatened by whatever good faith decision they made as SLC 
members.”151 
 
The Oracle court stated that the recognized “domination and control” ground should not 
serve as the basis of the independence inquiry.152 The court explained: 
 
Delaware law should not be based on a reductionist view of human nature that simplifies 
human motivations on the lines of the least sophisticated notions of the law and 
economics movement. Homo sapiens is not merely homo economicus. We may be 
thankful that an array of other motivations exist that influence human behavior; not all 
are any better than greed or avarice, think of envy, to name just one. But also think of 
motives like love, friendship, and collegiality, think of those among us who direct their 
behavior as best they can on a guiding creed or set of moral values.153 
 
Explaining further, the court stated: 
 
                                                 
146 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 920–21. 
147 Id. at 921. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 929–30. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 930. 
152 Id. at 937–38. The court provides an example:  
Imagine if two brothers were on a corporate board, each successful in different businesses 
and not dependent in any way on the other's beneficence in order to be wealthy. The 
brothers are brothers, they stay in touch and consider each other family, but each is 
opinionated and strong-willed. A derivative action is filed targeting a transaction 
involving one of the brothers. The other brother is put on a special litigation committee to 
investigate the case. If the test is domination and control, then one brother could 
investigate the other. Does any sensible person think that is our law? I do not think it is. 
Id. 
153 Id. at 938. 
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Nor should our law ignore the social nature of humans. To be direct, corporate directors 
are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed in social institutions. Such institutions 
have norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence and channel the 
behavior of those who participate in their operation. Some things are “just not done,” or 
only at a cost, which might not be so severe as a loss of position, but may involve a loss 
of standing in the institution. In being appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law also 
cannot assume - absent some proof of the point - that corporate directors are, as a general 
matter, persons of unusual social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that 
social norms generate for ordinary folk.154 
 
The self-interest of a director may flow from “personal or other relationships,” in addition 
to a financial stake.155 As the court acknowledged, “it is, I daresay, easier to say no to a friend, 
relative, colleague, or boss who seeks assent for an act (e.g., a transaction) that has not yet 
occurred than it would be to cause a corporation to sue that person” and thus, “denying a fellow 
director the ability to proceed on a matter important to him may not be easy, but it must, as a 
general matter, be less difficult than finding that there is reason to believe that the fellow director 
has committed serious wrongdoing and that a derivative suit should proceed against him.”156 An 
affirmative answer by the SLC could potentially have big negative consequences for the 
defendants, exposing them to the possibility of a large damage award in addition to greatly 
harming their reputation.157 Therefore, the court adhered to the view that Delaware law requires 
courts to consider the independence of directors based on the facts known to the court about 
them specifically, the so-called “subjective ‘actual person’ standard.”158  
                                                 
154 Id.   
155 See id. at 938–39 (quoting Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 24 (Del.Ch.2002)). 
156 Id. at 940. 
157 Id. at 940–41. Emphasizing human nature, the court also pointed out that: 
The importance and special sensitivity of the SLC's task is also relevant for another 
obvious reason: investigations do not follow a scientific process like an old-fashioned 
assembly line. The investigators' mindset and talent influence, for good or ill, the course 
of an investigation. Just as there are obvious dangers from investigators suffering from 
too much zeal, so too are dangers posed by investigators who harbor reasons not to 
pursue the investigation's targets with full vigor….  
 
The nature of the investigation is important, too. Here, for example, the SLC was 
required to undertake an investigation that could not avoid a consideration of the 
subjective state of mind of the Trading Defendants. Their credibility was important, and 
the SLC could not escape making judgments about that, no matter how objective the 
criteria the SLC attempted to use. 
Id. at 941. 
158 Id. at 942. In this inquiry: 
a court must often apply to the known facts about a specific director a consideration of 
how a reasonable person similarly situated to that director would behave, given the 
limited ability of a judge to look into a particular director's heart and mind. This is 
especially so when a special litigation committee chooses, as was the case here, to 
eschew any live witness testimony, a decision that is, of course, sensible lest special 
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In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,159 is another case where plaintiffs successfully 
challenged the objectivity and impartiality of the independent directors participating on the SLC. 
The shareholders sued the directors for violation of their fiduciary duty because they usurped the 
opportunity from eBay of participating in the IPOs.160 eBay had hired Goldman Sachs to 
underwrite its IPO. eBay’s board of directors consisted of seven members,161 including three 
defendant-directors and one former director who had all received initial public offering (IPO) 
allocations from Goldman.162 
 
The court concluded that directors who received IPO allocations were obviously 
interested in the transactions.163 The other four directors of eBay did not participate in the 
“spinning” and served on the SLC formed to determine whether the case against the defendant 
directors should proceed.164  Plaintiffs alleged that non-participating directors all had “close 
business and personal ties with the individual defendants” and could not exercise necessary 
independent judgment in order to determine whether eBay should bring a breach of fiduciary 
duty action against these individual defendants.165  
 
The court noted that defendant directors (and their affiliates) owned about one-half of 
eBay’s outstanding common stock, and thus they had the ability to control eBay and to direct 
business and affairs, including electing directors and approving significant corporate 
transactions.166 The SLC members were awarded stock options with the alleged value potentially 
running into the millions of dollars.167 Many of the options awarded to the independent directors 
had not yet vested at the moment of transaction approval and would never vest so long as the 
independent directors remained.168 Thus, the court held that one could not conclude realistically 
that the SLC members “would be able to objectively and impartially consider a demand to bring 
litigation against those to whom [they were] beholden for [their] current position and future 
position on eBay’s board.”169 
 
                                                 
litigation committee termination motions turn into trials nearly as burdensome as the 
derivative suit the committee seeks to end. But with that sensible choice came an 
acceptance of the court's need to infer that the special litigation committee members are 
persons of typical professional sensibilities. 
Id. at 940 (quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1167 (Del. 1995)). 
159 No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2004). 
160 Id. at *1-2. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at *2. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. at *3. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 3. 
169 Id. 
21 
 
Courts have also found certain business and social relationships adversely affect the 
impartiality of independent directors. For example, shareholders successfully showed that a 
board member could not act independently of the company's chairman, “where the board 
member had a close friendship of over half a century with the interested party [and] the director's 
primary employment (and that of his brother) was as an executive of a company over which the 
interested party had substantial influence.”170  
 
Deep friendship ties have also been found to impact the determination of independence. 
In Sandy, a director and her husband co-owned private airplane with the board chairman, who 
was also controlling stockholder and was interested the transaction at issue.171 According to the 
court, it created reasonable doubt about the director’s independence because “plane ownership 
was not common and involved partnership in an expensive personal asset that required close 
cooperation in use, which was suggestive of detailed planning indicative of continuing, close 
personal friendship.”172 
 
II. Effects of Independence on Corporate Governance - Empirical Studies 
 
Scholars have been attempting to empirically discern the effect of independent board on 
corporate governance issues. This Part provides a summary of key findings.  
 
A. Board Composition and Firm Performance 
Empirical evidence on the relation between independent directors and firm performance 
is mixed. There is a significant body of literature finding a positive relation between shareholder 
wealth or firm performance and boards with outside independent directors.173 Two studies 
                                                 
170 Delaware Cty. Employees Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1019 (Del. 2015). 
171 Sandy, 152 A.3d at 128, 130. 
172 Id. at 124. 
173 See Michael H. Schellenger et al., Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and 
Dividend Policy, 15 J. MGMT. 457, 465 (1989) (finding “a direct relationship between 
independent directors’ representation on the board and corporate financial performance”); see 
also Scott W. Barnhart, et al., Firm Performance and Board Composition: Some New Evidence, 
15 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 328, 338 (1994) (concluding that their study potentially 
indicates a relationship between firm performance and board composition); James F. Cotter et 
al., Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth during Tender Offers?, 43 J. 
FIN. ECON. 195, 216 (1997) (concluding that independent directors, among other things, enhance 
shareholder wealth); Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board 
Independence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 175, 190 (1990) (providing evidence 
that independent directors may increase the value of firms); Anzhela Knyazeva et al., The Supply 
of Corporate Directors and Board Independence, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 1561, 1597 (2013) (“[W]e 
find that board independence has significant positive effects on firm value . . . .”); Audra L. 
Boone et al., The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical 
Analysis, 85 J. OF FIN. ECON. 66, 90-91 (2007); John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside 
Directors Monitor Managers? 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 220 (1992); Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257, 271-272 (2008); Rick 
Molz, Managerial Domination of Boards of Directors and Financial Performance, 16 J. BUS. 
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focused solely on tender offers.174 These studies found a positive relation between independent 
members and returns to shareholders during tender offers.175  On the other hand, other scholars 
could not find any relationship between number of independent members on company boards 
and performance.176  Hermalin and Weisbach, for example, claim that even if their results are 
due to a measurement error, the relationship between these two variables, if any, must be weak at 
best.177  Nikos Vafeas, could not find a relationship between board composition and earnings-
return relation.178  
 
Some studies find that director independence is conditionally effective. One study found 
that if cost of acquiring information is low, the addition of independent directors enhances 
financial performance. 179 On the other hand, a high cost of information acquisition causes 
independent directors to worsen financial performance. The same relationships were suggested to 
exist between earnings management and board independence.180 Monitoring quality was also 
found to improve if a majority of independent directors serve on multiple monitoring committees 
in a company.181 In addition, firms with independent directors serve on multiple monitoring 
committees were found to exhibit more sensitivity to CEO compensation, CEO turnover, and 
earnings management.182  
 
Boone et al. find a positive relation between the firms’ board independence and the firms’ 
growth and diversification while also negatively related to CEO influence on board decisions.183 
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Fich and Shivdasani find that the busyness of independent directors is associated with weak 
governance.184 Busy independent directors are also likely to quit boards after poor 
performance.185 Weisbach finds that independent directors are positively associated with 
resignations of CEOs after bad performance.186   
 
B. Board Composition and Monitoring 
Some authors suggest that there are significant trade-offs between board composition and 
monitoring. Independent directors provide advice and counsel to executives, while at the same 
time they monitor them.187 As independent directors monitor more, executives tend to reveal less 
information to then.188 These studies thus suggest that management-friendly boards can be 
optimal depending on conditions.189  Another study attempted to address optimal board size and 
board composition and found that these depend on the characteristics of the firm and the 
particular directors.190 
Furthermore, transparency is another important issue in corporate governance.  One study 
shows that transparency has a positive relation with the percentage of independent directors.191  
C. Board Composition and CEO Role 
A positive relationship has been found between separation of CEO positions from that of 
the chair of board and subsequent operating performance.192 The drafters of the Commonsense 
Corporate Governance Principles (the Principles) argue that a board’s independent directors 
should analyze and decide whether the roles of chairman and CEO should be separate or 
combined.193 If the board chooses a combined role, the Principles point out that a strong lead 
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independent director with clearly defined authorities and responsibilities is vital for the board.194 
In addition, the Principles encourage boards to explain the choice to shareholders.195  
 
Studies have also found a negative relation between CEO compensation and the level of 
control from board of directors.196  Similarly, equity ownership of board members has a negative 
relationship with CEO compensation.197  Equity ownership of board members was found be even 
more important than percentage of independent directors on the board in affecting CEO pay.198 
Steven Kaplan finds that CEOs are indeed monitored by boards: CEO pay levels are not 
significantly higher than other top-income groups in 2012 compared to the levels in early 1990s 
and CEOs are rewarded for high performance and penalized for low performance upon 
examination of listed companies within the U.S.199   
Shivdesani and Yermack studied the CEO’s role in selecting directors, such as his or her 
presence on nominating committees.200 They found that a CEO on the nominating committee 
results in fewer independent outside directors, and more gray outsiders (those who have conflict 
of interests) on company boards.201 They claim that CEOs reduce the pressure of active 
monitoring by using this mechanism.202  Responding to similar criticism, the NYSE manual 
mandates complete independence of members of the governance committee of listed 
companies.203 Nonetheless, CEOs are still heavily involved in appointments of new directors. 
D. Connections between the CEO and Board Members 
 
Academics are generally in agreement about the relationship between connectedness of 
CEO with directors as well as other top executives and corporate fraud.204 Professor Khanna 
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finds that connectedness through past employment, education, and social organizations 
significantly affects the incidence of corporate fraud.205 N. K. Chidambaran and colleagues argue 
that nonprofessional connections, such as alma mater, increase the likelihood of fraud while 
professional connections from employment overlaps lower the probability of fraud.206 In 
addition, these authors argue that independence is only a necessary, but not a sufficient element 
to stop corporate crime.207 Randall Morck introduced social psychology theories to the analysis 
and claims that related literature indeed lacks evidence of the relationship between board 
independence and corporate performance, potentially due to hidden deep personal ties between 
independent directors and CEOs.208  
Jeffrey Coles et al. introduces the term “co-option” to redefine independence of boards.209 
Co-option is the fraction of the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed 
office, making them likelier to side with the CEO.210 The authors argue that co-option reduces 
the board’s monitoring, negatively impacts the connection between CEO turnover and firm 
performance, but increases CEO pay and investments.211 Based on the data, they conclude that 
co-opted independent directors are not associated with the effective monitoring.212  
A positive relationship has been also found between stock ownership of independent 
board members and the probability of disciplinary actions toward management in case of poor 
performance.213  These findings may suggest that stock ownership provides additional incentives 
for the board members to monitor management actions.  
E. Insider Trading 
Professors Ravina and Sapienza analyze insider trading of independent directors and 
other executives.214 Their results show that there is very little difference between the insider 
trading profits of independent directors and executives; the profits for both groups are also higher 
in companies with weaker corporate governance.215 Another study analyzes insider trading of 
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independent directors who serve on multiple boards.216 Cook and Wang find that audit and 
compensation committee memberships increase trading performance.217 Moreover, multi-firm 
directors outperform single-firm directors in their insider trading profitability.218 
F.          Earnings Fraud 
A number of studies have found that firms are less likely to commit earnings 
management tactics or financial statement fraud if they have boards or audit committees with 
independent directors.219 On the other hand, Ferris’ and Yan’s study leads to the opposite 
conclusion, claiming no significant relationship between board independence and financial 
statement fraud.220 Another study found that family affiliations may also play a role in the 
likelihood of financial fraud—firms with CEOs from the founding family are more likely to 
restate financial statements.221  
 
III. Our Empirical Study 
 
As described above, independent directors have been relied upon to monitor management 
and to thus maximize shareholder wealth.222 Where there is a conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders, independent directors are thought to be able to prohibit managers 
from acting in their self-interest. 223 
 
Some studies find a positive relationship between directors’ compensation and directors’ 
monitoring of the executives.224  Yet other studies reveal that independent directors are not as 
efficient as in protecting shareholder wealth as projected.225  
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We test two mutually exclusive hypotheses to measure the effectiveness of independent 
directors on company boards. The first hypothesis is that independent directors act in favor of 
shareholders.  That is, they act in the corporate interest and do not seek to personally profit when 
doing so.   
 
The second hypothesis is that directors, when presented with certain circumstances and 
have the same opportunities to act in their self-interest as executives, behave the same as the 
executives acting in their own self-interest.    
 
If the first hypothesis is true, then independent directors act good faith, and including 
them on corporate boards creates value for shareholders. However, if instead the second 
hypothesis is true, then reliance of independent directors as effective corporate monitors should 
be questioned.  
 
We test these hypotheses by examining the insider trading by top executives, independent 
directors and all officers excluding outsiders in the presence of a class-action lawsuit that 
resulted in a settlement. We also compare securities class actions (SCAs) of firms that settled 
class action claims with the firms that were not involved in SCAs. If independent directors are a 
good monitor of executive behavior, we would expect independent directors to refrain from 
trading company stock during the class action period.  If the second hypothesis is correct, we 
would expect independent directors to behave similar to insiders and sell company stock during 
the class action period.  
 
 
A. Data  
 
This study analyzes the insider trading activities of top executives, officers, dependent 
directors, and independent directors of the companies listed in the Stanford Law School 
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC). SCAC keeps track of more than 4,000 class 
action lawsuits filed in Federal Court since the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995.226  
 
A Securities Class Action (SCA) is a claim filed on behalf of a group of shareholders. 
The complaint contains allegations that the company or its managers violated at least one federal 
or state securities law, but most are brought under federal law.227 Commonality of interest is 
                                                 
226 Stanford Law School, About Us, SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, 
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Answers: Class Actions, U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-
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required to certify a class and plaintiffs must demonstrate that the claims of the representatives of 
class are typical of every class member.228  
 
The analysis period of the study is 1996–2016, our data set contains 4,041 filed cases. 
Law firms often file a class action lawsuit if any large negative shock occurs in share prices, thus 
it is not likely that any large class-action lawsuit would be excluded from this data set.229  After 
obtaining data from the SCAC, we applied filters to account for frivolous cases. We eliminated 
dismissed and ongoing cases, private company cases, and cases with settlement amounts lower 
than $25 million. We set a minimum settlement amount to ensure that damages are sufficiently 
large for injured parties, and insiders can predict the effect of drop in share prices. We are left 
with 131 companies after the filters.   
 
We collected insider trading data from Thomson Reuters (TFN) from 1996 to 2017.230 
Between 1975 and 1995, we have obtained insider trading data from the National Archives.  We 
combine these two datasets to create a continuous record of insider trading covering the period 
from 1975 to 2017.  Our database consists of legally-mandated reporting of the universe of all 
insider transactions; it contains the date, volume and the amount of purchases and sales of insider 
trading, names and titles of insiders, as well name and CUSIP number of the firm, and other 
information.231 We use the information on insider trading of top executives, independent 
directors, dependent directors, and other officers. Top executives, dependent directors, and other 
officers, and independent directors are classified using role codes in the TFN database. Top 
executives are limited to officer and director (OD), officer, director, and beneficial owner (H), 
chairman of the board (CB), CEO (CEO), CFO (CFO), controlling person (CP), general partner 
(GP), and president (P). Independent directors are coded with (D).  Inside directors and other 
officers are defined as all other officers. We include any large shareholder with any officer title. 
We exclude outside large shareholders (SH) and outside beneficial owner of more than 10% of a 
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class security (B). These outside groups are typically harmed by corporate fraud and thus they 
are not likely to be aware of any ongoing corporate fraud. 
 
Next, we combine the SCAC and insider trading information and we are left with the trading 
activities of insiders from companies that were involved in fraud settlements after enactment of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.232  We construct pre-class and post-class 
periods as control periods. The pre-class, class, and post-class periods have the same number of 
days. For example, if class period is 100 days, so are the pre-class and post-class periods. The 
pre-class period starts from 100 days before the class period begins and ends the day before the 
class action starts. Similarly, the post-class period starts the day after the class period ends and 
lasts 100 days. We test the timing of insider trading activities for the pre-class period before the 
class action starts, during the class action period, and for the post-class period.  
 
 
B. Methodology:  Measuring Insiders’ Abnormal Stock Profits 
 
 
We use a standard event study model to measure abnormal returns of insiders around 
trade dates. The event date, day 0, is the insider trade day for each transaction. We measure 
cumulative abnormal returns around event days by using market-adjusted daily returns as 
follows:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = ∑ 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 (𝑟𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
 
where Hi,t takes value 1 for insider purchases and -1 for insider sales. The variable ri,t is the 
return to stock i on day t. rm,t is the market return, which is with-dividend return to the CRSP 
equally-weighted portfolio of the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and 
NASDAQ stocks for day t. An insider purchase is profitable if the stock return outperforms 
market return, and an insider sale is profitable if stock return is less than market return for day t. 
Next, we cumulate all abnormal returns for 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, 200, and 250 days after the 
event to compute abnormal profits gained from insider trades.  
 
C. Overall Comparisons 
 
Table 1 displays the sample characteristics of insider trading in all public firms between 
1996 and 2017. This table provides information about trades of officers and directors, top 
executives, and independent directors. Purchases and sales are reported separately. We also 
classify companies into three categories. Small-cap firms are firms with less than $1 billion 
market capitalization. Midcap firms are defined by market capitalization between $1 billion and 
$5 billion. Large cap firms have higher than $5 billion in market capitalization. 
 
                                                 
232 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
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The table shows that the number of firms involved in insider trading and the number of 
trades are decreasing with market capitalization, while the average trade size is increasing with 
market capitalization. The number of sales are more frequent than the number of purchases. 
Insider sales to purchase ratio numbers are slightly more than 3-1  The ratio of purchases to sales 
is highest for large-cap firms (17-1); lower for mid-cap firm (9-1) and lowest for small firms 
(1.7-1) and it follows similar patterns for officers, directors, top executives, and independent 
directors. This pattern shows that independent directors behave like other insider traders. 
 
Next we compare the overall profitability for independent directors and other insiders.  
Table 2 shows insiders’ abnormal profits computed in all publicly listed firms between 1975 and 
2017. Our evidence shows that all officers, top executives and independent directors trade 
profitably. Following these transactions, all officers earn about 4.0% in abnormal returns, top 
executives earn around 4.9% and independent directors earn around 4.1%. Overall, our evidence 
indicates that for the 43-year period from 1975 to 2017, independent directors trade in a similar 
fashion and earn comparable profits as other insiders.  There is no evidence of any “independent” 
behavior by independent directors.    
 
 
D. Class-Action Subsample Comparisons 
 
Table 3 displays the sample characteristics of insiders in firms that settled securities fraud 
class actions during the same period (1996 through 2017). Once again, insider sales are more 
than insider purchases. Insider sales to purchase ratio now numbers more than 10-1.  Thus, firms 
involved in class action lawsuits are three times more likely to experience insider selling than the 
overall sample.  The number of firms and the number of trades are higher for firms with higher 
market capitalization, indicating higher insider trading activity in large SCA-settled firms. The 
average class period is around 612 calendar days.  The class period generally increases along 
with market capitalization.  
 
The average settlement amount is increasing monotonically with market capitalization.  
The average settlement amount is around $60-$90 million for small-cap stocks. This amount 
grows to about $250-275 million for large-cap stocks. This finding indicates that larger firms 
with deeper pockets tend to settle for larger amounts. 
 
Next, we turn our attention to profitability of insider trading in SCA-settled firms. Table 
4 displays insiders’ abnormal profits in firms subject to securities fraud lawsuits between 1996 
and 2017 and settled at least for $25 million. We examine insider trading separately before the 
class period, during the class period, and after the class period. The first column shows the 
number of observations in each column. The number of insider trading by officers and top 
executives are comparable while number independent directors have engaged in about half as 
many insider trading transactions as officers or top executives.  
 
The number of insider trades is numerous during the class period as compared to pre- and 
post-class periods even though the length of the periods is the same. This indicates that the class 
period involves more information asymmetry and thus more profitability from insider trading 
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than pre- and post-class periods. This fact is valid for all insider groups; however, it is more 
pronounced for top executives and independent directors.  
 
The first three lines of Table 4 show the abnormal returns of insider trading to officers 
(except independent directors) in pre-class, class, and post-class periods. Pre-class period 
abnormal returns are statistically not different from 0 for 4,656 observations. The number of 
insider trading transactions increase to 6,747 in the class period. The abnormal returns of all 
officers reach up to 35% during the 250 days after insider trading transaction. Moreover, 
abnormal profitability for 20 to 250 days is statistically significant for this insider trading group. 
This finding shows that officers use their material nonpublic information to make profits in the 
class period. There are 1,424 insider trading transactions in the post-class period, which do not 
show profitability for the first 50 days after insider trading. We observe significant profits after 
100-, 150-, 200- and 250-day event periods, the profitability reaches up to 31% for the 250-day 
period.  
 
The profitability of top executives is shown in the next three lines. There is no significant 
profitability in the pre-class period for 3,464 observations. Top executives increase number of 
transactions to 6,485 during the class period. Abnormal profitability of top executives rise up to 
23% after 250 days of insider trading. Further, top executives’ transactions display statistically 
significant abnormal returns immediately after the insider trading day. This finding indicates that 
top executives do not refrain from trading based on material non-public information like other 
officers. During the post-class period, top executives engage in 2,295 insider trading 
transactions. Profitability of insider trading to top executives continue in the post-event period 
and reaches up to 44% 250 days after insider trading. Once again, top executives’ transactions 
display profitability immediately after the insider trading day.   
 
Finally, we can see independent directors’ insider trading in the last three rows. There are 
1,903 pre-class period insider trading transactions and their abnormal returns are not statistically 
different from 0.  Hence, independent directors do not profit in the pre-class period. The number 
of transactions increase up to 3,700 in the class period. Abnormal returns to independent 
directors reach up to 16% in the 250- day event period. However, independent directors do not 
attain any significant profitability until about 200 days after the insider trading day. This 
evidence indicates that independent directors trade intensely based on material non-public 
information. Independent directors conduct 1,670 transactions in the post-class period. 
Profitability is fluctuating, yet always positive in this period. Profitability after 200 days is about 
9%, after 250 days is about 5%. Moreover, the independent directors’ profits display statistically 
significant results immediately after the insider trading days. This evidence shows that abnormal 
profits continue with breaks even after the class period.  
 
Next, we analyze whether the adoption of SOX impacted the trading behavior of the 
insiders of SCA- settled firms. Table 5A shows abnormal returns from insider trading before 
enactment of SOX. Hence the analysis period is January 1996 to September 2002 for this table. 
The number of transactions among insider groups varies from 173 to 1,817.  For all three groups, 
insiders always display profitable trading during the Class Period.  All officers earn 33%, top 
executives earn 48%, while the independent directors earn 23%.  All officers and top executives 
continue to trade during the post Class Periods, while independent directors’ transactions during 
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the post Class period do not attain statistical significance.  This evidence confirms that once 
again all three groups behave similarly, and earn abnormal trading profits using the inside 
information regarding the class action lawsuits.   
 
Next we test whether the enactment of SOX made any difference in the behavior of 
independent directors.  Table 5B displays the abnormal returns in the post-SOX period, between 
September 2002 and December 2017.  First we notice that for all three groups of insiders, they 
all trade the greatest number of transactions during the Class period.  For all three groups, the 
number of transactions during the Class Period, doubles or trebles compared to pre- and post-
Class Periods.  This evidence indicates that if anything all three groups of insiders have become 
more aggressive in exploiting their securities-lawsuit related information during the Class Period 
after the enactment of SOX.   
 
Table 5B shows that abnormal profitability of insider trading continues at high levels 
even after the passage of SOX.  All officers earn 36%, top executives earn 19% while 
independent directors earn 15% from insider trading during the Class Period after the passage of 
SOX.  Once again, both the abnormal profitability of trading as well as the number of 
transactions by independent directors follow very similar patterns as those for all officers and top 
executives.  Independent directors behave very similarly to all other top management groups 
both before and after the passage of SOX.  This evidence is consistent with the conclusion that 
independent directors’ interests continue to appear to be aligned with other members of top 
management and not with shareholders.   
 
While not shown, we also explore insiders’ purchase and sales transactions separately.  
Our evidence indicates that overwhelming the majority of insider trading in class-action involved 
firms come from sales, and not purchases.  Furthermore, abnormal profits from insiders’ 
purchase transactions never attain positive statistical significance for firms involved in class 
action lawsuits.  Instead, all abnormal profitability is restricted to insiders’ sales only.  Thus, our 
evidence indicates that insiders exclusively exploit their negative information regarding the 
potential lawsuits, sell their own firms’ stock and earn abnormal profits from these sales.  
Earning abnormal profits from their sales transactions represents a further conflict of interest 
between shareholders and top management. 
 
As a sensitivity test, we analyze the profitability of insider trading for smaller 
settlements. Table 6 presents the abnormal profitability of insider trading for settlements between 
$3 million and $25 million. The evidence shows that profitability is continuing even for smaller 
settlements. Abnormal profitability of insiders with smaller settlement in the class period is 36%, 
19%, and 15% for all officers, top executives, and independent directors, respectively. 
Comparing abnormal returns of insiders from companies with larger settlements, we observe that 
profitability of insider trading is somewhat higher for smaller settlement cases. One possible 
explanation for these results is that insiders may be viewing the costs of profitable trading to be 
smaller in smaller settlement cases. Consequently, all three groups of insiders are taking more 
aggressive trading positions to exploit their asymmetric information advantage.  
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IV. Implications for Improving Corporate Governance 
 
The presence of independent directors on the board has advantages and disadvantages. 
Some commentators argue that insiders also play a vital role, even considering their lack of 
independence because they act as a source of important firm-specific information for the 
board.233 Insider members advise the CEO, and therefore they are the main source of increasing 
company value. They know activities of company very well and therefore they can increase the 
company performance. Insiders also have the information, knowledge, and resources that may 
allow them to more accurately monitor their fellow insiders.234 On the other hand, dependent 
members are directly involved with daily operational management and related decision-making, 
and therefore may lack objectivity or worse.  The following Part discusses various critiques of 
the role of independent boards, including the infrequency of judicial findings of liability for 
failure of oversight, with implications for improving corporate governance. 
 
A. Critiques of Independent Boards 
 
Heavy reliance by independent board members on the insider’s financial analysis is a 
weakness of the current monitoring model, making supervision more problematic.  For example, 
independent members are less informed than insiders about the firm’s constraints and 
opportunities.235 The fix is not easy—as independent board members increase their involvement 
into the operations of a firm, costs will likely increase, eventually making monitoring infeasible. 
Whether American boards need more independent members, thus, remains unclear.  
 
The CEO’s informal influence over board appointments provides another challenge for 
board independence.  Agency theory claims that as long as CEO is the leader of the board, his or 
her influence remains high.236 On the other hand, management theory advocates for a single 
strong leader of the company to assure unity of command at the top.237 Regulatory efforts, such 
as mandating independent nominating committees, majority voting, and certain changes of proxy 
access, may reduce the tension between board members and CEO. As mentioned above, both the 
NYSE and NASDAQ require either firms to appoint a nominating committee or employ a 
process under which nominations are made by independent members of the boards.238 
 
There is evidence that the number of outsiders on the board increases as the CEO’s 
influence increases over top management.239  Independent members of the board are also 
                                                 
233 Linck, et al., supra note 70, at 310. 
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encouraged to meet without managerial members in order to keep managerial influence at 
minimum.240  
 
Professor Bebchuk, contends that to enhance monitoring of the CEO, it is important to 
decrease the degree of the CEO’s informal influence over board appointments and make these 
directors accountable to public investors through improved elections.241 Furthermore, in the 
controlled firms, there are a slightly different set of issues.242  Bebchuk further argues that the 
manner of electing board members decreases the effectiveness of independent director 
oversight243—because controllers have a strong influence on selection of board candidates, 
independent members have weighty incentives to support the controller, undermining their 
strength in conflicted decisions.244  
 
The assumption that independent outside directors will monitor the actions of 
management to minimize agency costs and maximize shareholder value may find its roots in 
public perception rather than facts.245 The underlying logic behind that notion presupposes that 
because independent members are less committed to company operations and management, they 
are not subject to agency problems, and thus they are expected to monitor dependent members.246 
On the other hand, as the practice demonstrates, they can be passive and ineffective when they 
lack enough information about company activities247 and further, they may hinder efficient 
operation of board of directors.248  
 
B. Liability of Independent Directors for Failure of Oversight  
 
Independent directors are rarely found liable for violation of their oversight duties in 
either civil or criminal contexts.249 And even if independent board members are charged with a 
violation, because of insurance, indemnification, and statutory protections, their liability rarely 
leads to out-of-pocket damages.250 Given the infrequency of the independent director’s liability, 
which seems to be a primary motivation for a proper oversight, effectiveness of their monitoring 
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activities is questionable. Some authors point out, however, that the threat of increased liability 
may discourage people from directorships, leading to a lack of well-qualified independent 
candidates in future.251 But because government regulators shift significant policing function in 
hands of independent directors, their least accountable status in corporate law is still concerning.  
 
Potentially, director liability for a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate attention 
may, in theory, arise in two distinct contexts.252 As the court in one case explained, “[f]irst, 
liability may be said to follow from a board decision that results in a loss because that decision 
was ill advised or ‘negligent.’ Second, liability to the corporation for a loss may be said to arise 
from an unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention would, 
arguably, have prevented the loss.253 But the business judgment rule applies to the first group of 
cases, effectively eviscerating the risk of liability, if the decision made was from a process that 
was deliberately considered in good faith or rational.254 Thus, stupid to egregious or irrational 
decisions provide no ground for director liability under the business judgment rule.255 The 
“business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good 
faith board decisions.”256 
 
Thus, where a director exercises a good faith effort, in fact, to be both informed and 
enable them to exercise appropriate judgment, this satisfies the duty of care.257 If shareholders 
are not satisfied with the judgment, as the court in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative 
Litigation noted, that is a past problem; they “should have elect other directors.”258 Thus, the 
“core element” of any corporate law duty of care inquiry is whether a good faith effort was made 
to be informed and exercise appropriate judgment.259 
 
The court went on to note that the “second class of cases in which director liability for 
inattention is theoretically possible entail circumstances in which a loss arises not from a 
decision but, from unconsidered inaction.”260 In this case, the court held that without some 
reason to suspect deceit, corporate boards and senior officers cannot be charged with any 
wrongdoings only because they assumed the integrity and honesty of employees that were acting 
on the company’s behalf.261 The court, at the same time, declined to accept the view that a 
corporate board does not have any responsibility to assure that appropriate information and 
reporting systems are put in place by management.262 
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 The level of detail appropriate for these information system is analyzed as business 
judgment decision, as the court noted.263 And the court held further that “no rationally designed 
information and reporting system will remove the possibility that the corporation will violate 
laws or regulations, or that senior officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or 
otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation's compliance with the 
law.”264 The board must, therefore, “exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation's 
information and reporting system is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that 
appropriate information will come to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary 
operations, so that it may satisfy its responsibility.”265 
 
 In In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation,266 the court noted that the presumptions 
that: 
 
“[I]n making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company”. . . . can be rebutted if the plaintiff shows that the directors breached their 
fiduciary of loyalty or acted in bad faith. If that is shown, the burden then shifts to the 
director defendants to demonstrate that the challenged act or transaction was entirely fair 
to the corporation and its shareholders.267 
 
 Later, in Stone v. Ritter,268 the court noted that the phrase in case law, which describes an 
absence of good faith as a “necessary condition to liability,”269 is intentional.270 The court further 
explained:  
 
[t][T]he purpose of that formulation is to communicate that a failure to act in good faith is 
not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the direct imposition of fiduciary liability. The failure 
to act in good faith may result in liability because the requirement to act in good faith “is a 
subsidiary element” i.e., a condition, “of the fundamental duty of loyalty.” It follows that 
because a showing of bad faith conduct, in the sense described in Disney and Caremark, is 
essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct 
is the duty of loyalty.271 
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Thus, the duty to act in good faith does not result in separate fiduciary duty.272 Only violations of 
duties of care and loyalty may lead directly to liability; an absence of good faith may do so as 
well, but more indirectly.273 
 
 Therefore, the Ritter court concluded, that the necessary conditions for director oversight 
liability include the following: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or 
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, 
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being 
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”274 For both of these tests, imposing 
liability requires showing directors knew that they failing to meet their fiduciary duties.275 If 
directors do not act when they know they have a duty to do so, they fail to discharge their 
fiduciary obligations in good faith and thus breach their duty of loyalty.276 
 
In Horman v. Abney,277 also known as the UPS case, shareholders brought a derivative 
action against board members of UPS, alleging that UPS breached their duty of loyalty by 
knowing failure of monitoring and managing UPS's compliance with state and federal laws 
concerning delivery and transportation of cigarettes, seeking to recover losses borne by the 
company from pending enforcement action that arose out of this breach of duty.278 The court 
explained that the Caremark liability standard for violating a duty to actively monitor corporate 
affairs is very much related to a director’s failure to act in good faith.279 Therefore, the court held 
to plead a claim under Caremark, the facts pled by the plaintiff must give rise to, or at least 
allow, a reasonable inference that a director acted in contradiction to his or her fiduciary duties, 
and knew he or she was acting in contradiction to such duties.280 
 
The UPS court further stated, however, that even if directors their oversight 
responsibilities in good faith, this does not mean that employees will not commit crimes, or that 
employees will not cause the corporation to sustain substantial financial liability.281 Accordingly, 
Delaware courts routinely reject the argument just that because there was an incident of illegal 
behavior, internal controls must have been insufficient, and the board must have had knowledge 
of this.282 Rather, a plaintiff must “plead with particularity” about how the illegal corporate 
conduct is related to the board’s actions.283  
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Explaining the first Caremark prong, the court held that “the board cannot be held liable 
for breaching its duty, under the first prong of Caremark, unless it can be proven that its 
members ‘utterly failed to implement any reporting or information systems or controls.’”284It is 
not a Caremark claim to show that a system that was implemented with care and seemed to be 
working well just failed to detect some fraud that occurred.285 In this case, as the court stated, 
“[a]t best, the [c]omplaint might support an inference that employees charged with the 
responsibility to implement UPS's oversight systems failed to report issues to the board. That is 
not enough to sustain a Caremark claim.”286 
  
The only way liability could be established in such a case is if the plaintiff shows that the 
board knew of corporate misconduct but consciously disregarded its duty to address this 
misconduct, thereby acting in bad faith.287 In this context, “bad faith means ‘the directors were 
conscious of the fact that they were not doing their jobs, and that they ignored red flags 
indicating misconduct in defiance of their duties.’”288 However, typically:  
 
[T]he red flag analogy depicts events or reports that serve as warning signs to the Board of 
corporate wrongdoing after a system of reporting and compliance is in place. These red 
flags put the board on notice that the system is not working properly. If the members of the 
board become aware of the red flags and do nothing in response, and thereby consciously 
disregard their fiduciary duties, then they are individually subject to liability for a failure 
of oversight.289  
 
Thus, under the second prong of Caremark, the question is whether the board knew of these red 
flags and then whether the board attempted to address these red flags.290  
 
In In re Citigroup, the court held that: 
 
[T]here are significant differences between failing to oversee employee fraudulent or 
criminal conduct and failing to recognize the extent of a company's business 
risk.Directors should, indeed must under Delaware law, ensure that reasonable 
information and reporting systems exist that would put them on notice of fraudulent or 
criminal conduct within the company. Such oversight programs allow directors to 
intervene and prevent frauds or other wrongdoing that could expose the company to risk 
of loss as a result of such conduct.291  
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More recently, the court in Reiter v. Fairbank, held that “imposing Caremark-type duties 
on directors to monitor business risk is fundamentally different from imposing on directors a 
duty to monitor fraud and illegal activity.”292 The case here involved an allegation that the 
“directors breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty by consciously disregarding their 
responsibility to oversee Capital One's compliance with the Bank Secrecy Act and other anti-
money laundering laws ‘(BSA/AML’).”293 Allegedly, these directors ignored he red flags were 
related to this compliance, and the plaintiff alleged certain inadequacies in provision of the 
services which in turn, allegedly exposed the bank to liability for money-laundering activities.294  
 
The court held, however, that directors, while acting in good faith, cannot always prevent 
employees' wrongdoings, and therefore, a plaintiff asserting a Caremark claim must demonstrate 
“a sufficient connection between the corporate trauma and the board.”295 To show such 
connection, the board must have known the evidence of corporate misconduct, and yet 
consciously disregarded its duty to address that wrongdoing.296 According to the court, the 
directors did not violate their fiduciary duties because the evidence involved at best yellow flags, 
and the plaintiff failed to show that "defendants consciously allowed Capital One to violate the 
law so as to sustain a finding they acted in bad faith."297 
 
Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
Currently, the reliance in corporate law on the role of independent directors to serve as 
gatekeepers in their monitoring role over management, is flawed.  Our empirical study provides 
new evidence that not only may independent directors be ill-equipped to engage in serious 
oversight of the activities of management, they may also be easily co-opted when they have the 
opportunity to personally participate in self-interested transactions to the detriment of the 
shareholders.  Our current study provides evidence that independent directors are not likely 
immune from the temptation to profit from insider trading and especially insider selling.  Our 
prior research also demonstrated that they are similarly likely to manipulate stock option 
compensation when the opportunity arose.298  And as described above in Part II, numerous other 
empirical studies have been critical of the ability of independent directors to effectively serve a 
monitoring function.  Moreover, the current legal doctrines providing deference to independent 
directors appear not to offer much in the way of a check on their behavior.  Finally, even the 
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definition of an independent director appears ineffective for avoiding conflicts of interest which 
arise from personal and social relationships. 
 
Thus, independent status is not a sufficient condition for the proper monitoring. The 
informed oversight of management may also depend on other characteristics, necessary for the 
performance of director’s functions, such as experience in the firm’s industry. One should not 
lean toward the other extreme, however, and mandate the experience as a prerequisite to the 
directorship. As the drafters of the Principles correctly point out “some of the best ideas, insights 
and contributions can come from directors whose professional experiences are not directly 
related to the company’s business.”299 But industry background may be particularly helpful in 
curtailing of corporate fraud, allowing independent members to catch certain red flags or 
inconsistencies in the company’s performance that may not be apparent to the industry outsider. 
The director’s experience may also deter management from manipulating and misleading the 
boards, given the high probability of getting caught. 
 
In addition, the current disclosure model has a significant flaw—companies do not 
explain in detail their reasoning to their shareholders and the market, nor justify the designation 
of a director as independent and disclose information they considered during their 
deliberations.300 The current disclosure requirements by the SEC about independence 
designations are incomplete as well.301 Because of this, Aaron Nili calls for an enhanced 
disclosure system, mandating the entire set of information that the company relied on in making 
their judgment about a director’s independence, allowing its shareholders and outsiders to 
subsequently check their designations.302 As a 2015 survey of institutional investors found, 62% 
of respondents read the director independence section of the proxy statement before voting.303 In 
conjuncture with the severe liability for a director for failure to disclose certain connections that 
a court later finds to be material, making public all available information, including facts 
submitted by the board candidate, may lead to a more scrutinized nomination process, reducing a 
firm’s discretion, and increase shareholders’ awareness of certain nuances, surrounding a 
candidate’s connectedness to the management, to provide for a fully informed vote. 
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An enhanced disclosure system may, however, create a certain chilling effect of the 
willingness of future candidates to become directors on the board.  But because the disclosures 
need ask only for facts, revealing the connections to the firm, if directors have something to hide, 
then as Nili argues, perhaps the chilling effect would be a positive development.304 
 
We also recommend a more nuanced definition of independence of independent directors.  
A director should be banned from serving as an independent director by the stock exchanges and 
SEC if a director fails to reveal a relationship, later found to be material by a court. The prospect 
of liability and reputational risks will provide a director an extra incentive to over-disclosure, 
particularly one’s social and casual connections to the company and its insiders. In addition, we 
agree with the eBay and Oracle contextual analyses of independence.305  Even if a director 
passes a general test of independence, independence must be determined, case by case, in the 
context of the events litigated. 
 
Finally, as proposed in our prior work,306 we continue to recommend more power be 
given to the shareholders to act as corporate monitors.   These recommendations include 
eliminating shareholder multi-class voting structures, making shareholder resolutions binding, 
eliminating plurality voting for board membership and replacing this with majority voting and 
requiring companies to set up secure websites to allow shareholders to review corporate issues 
and vote their choices.307 Of course, we realize that many shareholders do not care to participate 
in corporate governance. Yet, there are institutional and activist shareholders who do care and 
the current regime does not provide for a full opportunity for their voices to be heard. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading in All Firms (1975 to 2017) 
  
Small- Cap 
Firms 
Mid-Cap 
Firms 
Large-Cap 
Firms 
All Purchase 
Firms 
Small- Cap 
Firms 
Mid-Cap 
Firms 
Large-Cap 
Firms 
All Sale 
Firms 
  
Market 
Capitalization 
is less than $1 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is between $1 
Billion and $5 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is more than $5 
Billion   
Market 
Capitalization 
is less than $1 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is between $1 
Billion and $5 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is more than $5 
Billion   
  Purchases Sales 
Number of Firms 17,361 1,915 588 21,332 16,443 1,954 617 19,014 
Number of Trades 807,206 95,066 35,354 894,623 1,432,961 864,635 596,265 2,893,861 
Average Trade Size (Shares) 13,217 14,811 38,553 12,722.64 11,601 10,655 31,566 14,378 
Total Shares Traded by Officers 
and Directors (Million) 2,651 521 964 4,136 7,049 5,022 4,142 16,213 
Total Shares Traded by Top 
Executives(Million) 2,891 409 163 3,463 5,712 3,352 4,002 13,066 
Total Shares Traded by 
Independent Directors (Million) 5,127 478 236 5,841 5,300 3,786 3,243 12,329 
Total Shares Traded (Million)  10,669 1,408 1,363 13,340 18,061 12,160 11,387 41,608 
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Table 2 
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in all Publicly Listed Firms between 1975 and 2017. 
  Number of Observations 10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers (except Independent Directors) 1,423,271 0.44% 0.69% 1.50% 2.37% 2.86% 3.35% 4.04% 
    (4.41) (4.91) (6.71) (7.49) (7.35) (7.46) (8.04) 
Top Executives 1,316,440 0.70% 1.00% 1.80% 2.88% 3.62% 4.20% 4.92% 
    (6.78) (6.86) (7.77) (8.79) (9.00) (8.99) (9.43) 
Independent Directors 1,091,776 0.65% 0.90% 1.57% 2.34% 2.83% 3.26% 4.11% 
    (6.82) (6.64) (7.30) (7.65) (7.51) (7.49) (8.44) 
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 3 
Sample Characteristics of Insider Trading in Firms with Securities Fraud Settlements (1996 to 2017) 
  
Small- Cap 
Firms 
Mid-Cap 
Firms 
Large-Cap 
Firms 
All Purchase 
Firms 
Small- Cap 
Firms 
Mid-Cap 
Firms 
Large-Cap 
Firms 
All Sale 
Firms 
  
Market 
Capitalization 
is less than $1 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is between $1 
Billion and $5 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is more than $5 
Billion   
Market 
Capitalization 
is less than $1 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is between $1 
Billion and $5 
Billion 
Market 
Capitalization 
is more than $5 
Billion   
  Purchases Sales 
Number of Firms 19 43 53 115 33 45 54 132 
Length of Class Period (Days)  501 686 591 611 431 654 583 569 
Average Settlement ($Mill.) 65.9 107.1 253.0 167.5 179.7 115.3 275.0 196.7 
Number of Insider Trades 927 992 1074 2,993 2,313 14,014 15,393 31,720 
Average Trade Size (Shares) 17,522 25,509 46,875 34,036 11,601 10,654.6 31,565.9 19,445.8 
Total Shares Traded by Officers 
(Million) 10.2 9.5 19.0 38.7 8.6 65.0 132.0 205.6 
Total Shares Traded by Top 
Executives (Million) 4.5 8.6 12.1 25.2 9.7 53.0 228.7 291.4 
Total Shares Traded by 
Independent Directors (Million) 1.6 7.2 19.3 28.1 8.4 31.3 125.2 164.9 
Total Shares Traded (Million)  16.3 25.3 50.4 92.0 26.7 149.3 485.9 661.9 
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Table 4 
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million between 1996 and 2017  
  
Number of 
Observations 
10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers-Before Class Period 4,656 0.91% 0.45% 0.04% -1.73% -1.62% -3.48% -1.94% 
    (1.16) (0.40) (0.02) (-0.70) (-0.53) (-0.99) (-0.50) 
Officers-During Class Period 6,747 1.28% 2.19% 5.43% 11.12% 20.58% 28.09% 35.05% 
    (1.63) (1.98) (3.10) (4.49) (6.78) (8.02) (8.95) 
Officers-After Class Period 1,424 1.16% 1.35% 2.71% 11.45% 16.48% 23.58% 31.26% 
    (1.66) (1.37) (1.75) (5.20) (6.11) (7.57) (8.97) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 3,464 -0.01% -0.97% -0.15% 0.76% 3.77% 0.32% 4.94% 
    (-0.01) (-0.83) (-0.08) (0.29) (1.18) (0.09) (1.20) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 6,485 2.00% 4.41% 7.50% 10.37% 17.64% 21.86% 23.14% 
    (1.92) (3.00) (3.23) (3.15) (4.38) (4.71) (4.45) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 2,295 2.63% 1.87% 4.74% 16.04% 23.59% 32.66% 43.77% 
    (5.44) (2.74) (4.42) (10.48) (12.62) (15.13) (18.08) 
Independent Directors -Before Class Period  1,903 -0.03% -0.12% -0.22% -2.15% -2.04% -0.86% -0.96% 
    (-0.05) (-0.15) (-0.18) (-1.24) (-0.96) (-0.35) (-0.35) 
Independent Directors -During Class Period 3,700 1.09% 1.11% 2.19% 3.17% 5.01% 14.45% 16.42% 
    (0.99) (0.71) (0.89) (0.92) (1.18) (2.95) (3.00) 
Independent Directors -After Class Period 1,670 2.54% 2.93% 1.59% 1.64% 8.54% 9.59% 5.31% 
    (2.58) (2.10) (0.72) (0.52) (2.23) (2.17) (1.07) 
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
Table 5A 
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million between 1996 and 2002 (Pre-SOX) 
  
Number of 
Observations 
10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers-Before Class Period 1,817 0.57% -1.44% 0.37% 1.82% 4.28% 4.05% 6.60% 
    (0.68) (-1.21) (0.20) (0.68) (1.31) (1.07) (1.56) 
Officers-During Class Period 1,535 2.68% 5.78% 9.37% 14.21% 21.10% 26.55% 33.00% 
    (4.40) (6.74) (6.86) (7.34) (8.90) (9.69) (10.78) 
Officers-After Class Period 173 8.04% 12.14% 12.71% 16.37% 17.35% 21.72% 28.83% 
    (4.65) (4.96) (3.26) (2.96) (2.56) (2.78) (3.30) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 1,219 -0.75% -2.42% 1.46% 7.17% 19.38% 18.42% 23.46% 
    (-0.63) (-1.46) (0.55) (1.92) (4.25) (3.49) (3.98) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 943 3.73% 6.75% 9.93% 14.86% 28.58% 35.56% 47.91% 
    (4.14) (5.32) (4.92) (5.22) (8.18) (8.83) (10.63) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 524 2.11% 1.05% -0.81% 7.39% 23.03% 29.84% 38.05% 
    (1.37) (0.49) (-0.24) (1.53) (3.88) (4.35) (4.97) 
Independent Directors-Before Class Period 887 -0.20% -0.43% -1.67% -4.15% -4.94% -4.44% -3.14% 
    (-0.23) (-0.36) (-0.88) (-1.54) (-1.49) (-1.16) (-0.73) 
Independent Directors-During Class Period 468 2.56% 4.40% 7.43% 6.63% 13.99% 14.73% 22.84% 
    (2.86) (3.48) (3.71) (2.34) (4.03) (3.68) (5.09) 
Independent Directors-After Class Period  120 -0.53% -1.10% -9.86% -15.75% -7.71% 0.12% 3.96% 
    (-0.22) (-0.33) (-1.88) (-2.13) (-0.85) (0.01) (0.34) 
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 5B 
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Exceeding $25 Million between 2002 and 2017 (Post-SOX) 
  
Number of 
Observations 
10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
Officers-Before Class Period 2,839 1.12% 1.66% -0.17% -4.01% -5.40% -8.29% -7.41% 
    (0.97) (1.02) (-0.07) (-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.61) (-1.29) 
Officers-During Class Period 5,212 0.86% 1.14% 4.27% 10.21% 20.43% 28.55% 35.66% 
    (0.86) (0.81) (1.92) (3.24) (5.29) (6.40) (7.16) 
Officers-After Class Period 1,251 0.21% -0.14% 1.33% 10.77% 16.35% 23.83% 31.59% 
    (0.27) (-0.13) (0.79) (4.47) (5.54) (6.99) (8.28) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 2,245 0.39% -0.18% -1.02% -2.72% -4.70% -9.51% -5.11% 
    (0.36) (-0.12) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-1.98) (-0.95) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 5,542 1.70% 4.01% 7.08% 9.61% 15.78% 19.54% 18.97% 
    (1.42) (2.37) (2.64) (2.54) (3.40) (3.65) (3.16) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 1,771 2.79% 2.11% 6.37% 18.58% 23.76% 33.49% 45.46% 
    (3.75) (2.00) (3.83) (7.89) (8.26) (10.09) (12.22) 
Independent Directors-Before Class Period 1,016 0.12% 0.16% 1.05% -0.41% 0.49% 2.27% 0.94% 
    (0.17) (0.16) (0.67) (-0.19) (0.18) (0.73) (0.27) 
Independent Directors-During Class Period   3,232 0.88% 0.63% 1.42% 2.67% 3.71% 14.40% 15.49% 
    (0.70) (0.35) (0.51) (0.68) (0.77) (2.58) (2.48) 
Independent Directors-After Class Period  1,550 2.78% 3.24% 2.47% 2.99% 9.80% 10.32% 5.42% 
    (2.67) (2.20) (1.06) (0.90) (2.43) (2.22) (1.04) 
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
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Table 6 
Insiders' Abnormal Profits in Firms Subject to Securities Fraud Lawsuits that Resulted in Settlements Between $3 Million and $25 Million between 1996 and 2017. 
  
Number of 
Observations 
10-days 20-days 50-days 100-days 150-days 200-days 250-days 
All Officers-Before Class Period 2,839 1.12% 1.66% -0.17% -4.01% -5.40% -8.29% -7.41% 
    (0.97) (1.02) (-0.07) (-1.10) (-1.21) (-1.61) (-1.29) 
All Officers-During Class Period 5,212 0.86% 1.14% 4.27% 10.21% 20.43% 28.55% 35.66% 
    (0.86) (0.81) (1.92) (3.24) (5.29) (6.40) (7.16) 
All Officers-After Class Period 1,251 0.21% -0.14% 1.33% 10.77% 16.35% 23.83% 31.59% 
    (0.27) (-0.13) (0.79) (4.47) (5.54) (6.99) (8.28) 
Top Executives-Before Class Period 2,245 0.39% -0.18% -1.02% -2.72% -4.70% -9.51% -5.11% 
    (0.36) (-0.12) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-1.98) (-0.95) 
Top Executives-During Class Period 5,542 1.70% 4.01% 7.08% 9.61% 15.78% 19.54% 18.97% 
    (1.42) (2.37) (2.64) (2.54) (3.40) (3.65) (3.16) 
Top Executives-After Class Period 1,771 2.79% 2.11% 6.37% 18.58% 23.76% 33.49% 45.46% 
    (3.75) (2.00) (3.83) (7.89) (8.26) (10.09) (12.22) 
Independent Directors-Before Class  1,016 0.12% 0.16% 1.05% -0.41% 0.49% 2.27% 0.94% 
    (0.17) (0.16) (0.67) (-0.19) (0.18) (0.73) (0.27) 
Independent Directors-During Class  3,232 0.88% 0.63% 1.42% 2.67% 3.71% 14.40% 15.49% 
    (0.70) (0.35) (0.51) (0.68) (0.77) (2.58) (2.48) 
Independent Directors-After Class  1,550 2.78% 3.24% 2.47% 2.99% 9.80% 10.32% 5.42% 
    (2.67) (2.20) (1.06) (0.90) (2.43) (2.22) (1.04) 
*Bold are statistically significant at the 5% level or better 
